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OCT 27 1945

CHARLES ELMORE DROPLEY
CLERK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1945

No. 563

VALENTINE & SONS, A COPARTNERSHIP, A. L. RUSO &
CO., GEORGE COPRIVIZA & SON, COX & WAUGA-
MAN, PAPAC-NIRICH COMPANY AND MATIASE-
VICH BROS.,

Petitioners

vs.

CHESTER BOWLES, PRICE ADMINISTRATOR

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES EMERGENCY COURT OF AP-
PEALS AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF.

CAREY VAN FLEET,
EMMETT R. BURNS,
Counsel for Petitioners.

2



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MAN, PAPAC-NIRICH COMPANY AND MATIASE-
VICH BROS.,
Petitioners

vs.

CHESTER BOWLES, PRICE ADMINISTRATOR

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To the Honorable the Supreme Court of the United States:

The petition of Valentine & Sons, A. L. Russo & Co., George Copriviza & Son, Cox & Waugaman, Papac-Nirich Company and Matiasevich Bros. respectfully shows:

That the United States Emergency Court of Appeals is now and has been at all of the times hereinafter mentioned an inferior tribunal created by an Act of Congress on May 12, 1942, for the purpose of hearing and determining appeals from rulings made under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, which act creating and setting forth the

powers of the United States Emergency Court of Appeals is fully set forth in Volume 50 U. S. C. A., 1943 Supplement, pages 330 to 341, inclusive; that thereafter and on or about April 1, 1943 (said order being known as Order No. 10), the Office of Price Administrator issued an order establishing the price for services of dehydrating apples in the State of California; that said order was retroactive, confiscatory and unconstitutional and exceeded the jurisdiction and powers of the said Administrator as set forth by Congress; that thereafter the appellants as joint complainants, consisting of six in number, all with their place of business at Watsonville, California, filed an application complaining of the said order and the rate thereby established, complaining that the said price set forth in the said order, to-wit, \$110 per dried ton for C-grade apples or better, was confiscatory and that it did not allow an adequate return for the services or the capital invested. On appeal to the United States Emergency Court of Appeals, petitioners raised the following objections to the said order and Emergency Price Control Act, to-wit:

(a) The OPA acted in violation of authority as set forth by Congress;

(b) The OPA had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the complainants, the industry, the product, or the area involved herein;

(c) The jurisdiction over the subject matter, the person, the industry and the area involved herein rested with the War Production Board and the War Food Administration and was so conducted by these Boards;

(d) The OPA in attempting to regulate the industry usurped the powers of the War Production Board and the War Food Administration, and therefore its actions were illegal and unconstitutional;

(e) The action of the OPA was unconstitutional;

(f) The action of the OPA was confiscatory;

(g) The action of the OPA is admittedly based upon incomplete review of the price structure of the industry without notice, hearing or consultation as required by the Emergency Price Control Act;

(h) The regulation made by the OPA setting the price at \$110 per dried ton is in direct conflict with the actual facts in refusing to allow a return on interest, capital investment or upon the labor of one who employs another;

(i) The said order setting the price at \$110 not only refuses a return on capital investment, or a profit, but is actually confiscatory in that it refuses even the actual expenditures; that the action of the OPA in this instance was lacking in due process of law in violation of the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States;

(j) That the theory upon which the OPA has acted in this instance is a theory contrary to the guarantees expressed in the Constitution of the United States; that the said theory employed by the OPA disregards actual costs and states that it is proper for it to distribute the money of one person to another stranger without the consent of the person affected—in this instance the complainants, and without notice, hearing or consultation.

(k) That the said order of the OPA is in direct violation of the express contracts and impaired the obligation of the contracts.

(l) That the action of the OPA in its ruling of March 27, 1944, disregarding the Cox & Waugaman dryer's charges and the Papac-Nirich charges, is confiscatory and unconstitutional; that the said price is admittedly based on a refusal to regard repairs and maintenance of the plants of complainants and is unconstitutional;

(m) That the said price as established by the OPA was not based on that of a competitive dryer of the complainants and that the said OPA had no power by

regulation over the complainants on their services in this section.

That the said Price Administrator exceeded his jurisdiction in the exercise of establishing a price; that thereafter on the 26th day of September, 1945, the United States Emergency Court of Appeals rendered an opinion sustaining the said Price Control Act and the action of the Price Administrator; that the said court exceeded its jurisdiction in the exercise of a judicial function; that this court has jurisdiction by virtue of the Act of January 30, 1942, c. 26, Title II, section 204, 56 Stat. 31, found in 1943 Supplement to Title 50 U. S. C. A., section 924d, page 327.

Your petitioners have no other adequate or speedy means of remedy other than this writ of certiorari, as provided for under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and that your petitioners rely upon each and every aforementioned points heretofore set forth above (a) to (m).

WHEREFORE, your petitioners pray that the writ of certiorari may issue out of this court to the said United States Emergency Court of Appeals, to Chief Judge Maris and Magruder and McAllister, Judges, and to Chester Powles, Price Administrator, commanding them to certify and return to this court certain proceedings had before the said court as follows:

A full and complete certified copy of the proceedings heretofore conducted before the said United States Emergency Court of Appeals for the purpose of review, and that thereupon this court review and annul the decision of the United States Emergency Court of Appeals, and for such other, further and different relief as may be meet and just in the premises.

CAREY VAN FLEET,
EMMETT R. BURNS,

Counsel for Petitioners.



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VALENTINE & SONS, A COPARTNERSHIP, A. L. RUSSO &
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MAN, PAPAC-NIRICH COMPANY AND MATIASSE-
VICH BROS.,

vs.

Petitioners,

CHESTER BOWLES, PRICE ADMINISTRATOR

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION

This honorable Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment and decree in question by reason of the provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 found in 1943 Cumulative Annual Pocket Part of Title 50 U. S. C. A. Annotated, section 924d, page 327, which provides as follows:

“Within thirty days after entry of a judgment or order, interlocutory or final, by the Emergency Court of Appeals, a petition for a writ of certiorari may be filed in the Supreme Court of the United States, and thereupon the judgment or order shall be sub-

ject to review by the Supreme Court in the same manner as a judgment of a circuit court of appeals as provided in section 240 of the Judicial Code, as amended (U. S. C., 1934 edition, title 28, sec. 347). The Supreme Court shall advance on the docket and expedite the disposition of all causes filed therein pursuant to this subsection. The Emergency Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court upon review of judgments and orders of the Emergency Court of Appeals, shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any regulation or order issued under section 2 (section 902 of this Appendix), of any price schedule effective in accordance with the provisions of section 206 (section 926 of this Appendix) and of any provision of any such regulation, order, or price schedule. Except as provided in this section, no court, Federal, State, or Territorial, shall have jurisdiction or power to consider the validity of any such regulation, order, or price schedule, or to stay, restrain, enjoin, or set aside, in whole or in part, any provision of this Act authorizing the issuance of such regulations or orders, or making effective any such price schedule, or any provision of any such regulation, order, or price schedule, or to restrain or enjoin the enforcement of any such provision. Jan. 30, 1942, c. 26, Title II, section 204, 56 Stat. 31."

The said decree of the United States Emergency Court of Appeals was rendered on September 26, 1945.

The grounds upon which the petitioners rely are as follows:

(a) The OPA acted in violation of authority as set forth by Congress;

(b) The OPA had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the complainants, the industry, the product, or the area involved herein;

(c) The jurisdiction over the subject matter, the person, the industry and the area involved herein rested

with the War Production Board and the War Food Administration and was so conducted by these Boards;

(d) The OPA in attempting to regulate the industry usurped the powers of the War Production Board and the War Food Administration, and therefore its actions were illegal and unconstitutional;

(e) The action of the O. P. A. was unconstitutional;

(f) The action of the OPA was confiscatory;

(g) The action of the OPA is admittedly based upon incomplete review of the price structure of the industry without notice, hearing or consultation as required by the Emergency Price Control Act;

(h) The regulations made by the OPA setting the price at \$110 per dried ton is in direct conflict with the actual facts in refusing to allow a return on interest, capital investment or upon the labor of one who employs another;

(i) The said order setting the price at \$110 not only refuses a return on capital investment, or a profit, but is actually confiscatory in that it refuses even the actual expenditures; that the action of the OPA in this instance was lacking in due process of law in violation of the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the Constitution of the United States;

(j) That the theory upon which the OPA has acted in this instance is a theory contrary to the guarantees expressed in the Constitution of the United States; that the said theory employed by the OPA disregards actual costs and states that it is proper for it to distribute the money of one person to another stranger without the consent of the person affected—in this instance the complainants, and without notice, hearing of consultation;

(k) That the said order of the OPA is in direct violation of the express contracts and impaired the obligation of the contracts.

(l) That the action of the OPA in its ruling of March 27, 1944, disregarding the Cox & Waugaman dryer's charges and the Papac-Niric charges is confiscatory and unconstitutional; that the said price is admittedly based on a refusal to regard repairs and maintenance of the plants of complainants and is unconstitutional;

(m) That the said price as establish by the OPA was not based on that of a competitive dryer of the complainants and that the said OPA had no power by regulation over the complainants on their services in this section.


The case is one regulating the charges for services rendered by the petitioners for dehydrating apples and which services the Price Administrator attempted to regulate by an order issued on April 1, 1943, under a claimed power or jurisdiction delegated to him by the Congress of the United States in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and which unconstitutionally and confiscatory powers the United States Emergency Court of Appeals upheld and sustained in its opinion, judgment and decree of September 26, 1945.

Dated: San Francisco, California, this 25th day of October, 1945.

CAREY VAN FLEET,
EMMETT R. BURNS,
Counsel for Petitioners.

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INDEX

	Page
Opinion below	I
Jurisdiction	1
Questions presented	2
Statutes and regulations involved	2
Statement	3
Argument	5
Conclusion	13
Appendix	15

CITATIONS

Cases:

<i>Coy, United States ex rel. v. United States</i> , 316 U. S. 342....	8
<i>Yakus v. United States</i> , 321 U. S. 414.....	13

Statutes and Regulations:

Act of February 13, 1925, c. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 28 U. S. C. 350	7, 8
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, c. 26, 56 Stat. 23, 50 U. S. C. App., Supp. IV, sec. 901, as amended by Pub. No. 383, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess.: Section 2 (c)	11
Section 204	6, 7, 8, 9, 15
Judicial Code, Section 240, Act of Mar. 3, 1911, c. 231, § 240, 36 Stat. 1157, as amended, 28 U. S. C. 347	7, 16
General Maximum Price Regulation, 7 F. R. 3153	10
Maximum Price Regulation No. 165, as amended, 7 F. R. 6428, 7 F. R. 8943.....	2, 9, 10
Revised Maximum Price Regulation No. 165, 9 F. R. 7439 ..	10

Miscellaneous:

H. Rep. No. 1409, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.	9
Robertson and Kirkham, <i>Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States</i> , pp. 718, 777	8
S. Rep. No. 931, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.	9

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v.

CHESTER BOWLES, PRICE ADMINISTRATOR

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the United States Emergency Court of Appeals (R. 212-215) has not yet been reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Emergency Court of Appeals was entered September 26, 1945. On October 26, 1945, the Chief Justice entered an order extending the time for the filing of a petition for certiorari "to and including November 5th, 1945,

provided that power exists to extend such time under the applicable statutes" (R. 217). The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed October 27, 1945. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under section 204 (d) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, c. 26, 56 Stat. 23, 50 U. S. C. App. (Supp. IV), Sec. 924 (d) (herein sometimes termed "the Act"), making applicable Section 240 of the Judicial Code as amended (28 U. S. C. 347).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether this Court has power to entertain a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Emergency Court of Appeals filed more than thirty days after the entry of judgment by that court.
2. Whether the Price Administrator was arbitrary or capricious in denying to petitioners a retroactive increase in their maximum prices for the seasonal service of drying apples in excess of the retroactive price increase which the Office of Price Administration had previously granted on its own initiative.

STATUTES AND REGULATION INVOLVED

The pertinent provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and of the Judicial Code appear in the Appendix, *infra* pp. 15-16. The maximum price regulation involved appears in the Federal Register (7 F. R. 6428). The provision thereof relating to individual price adjustments is set forth

at page 10, *infra*. The general order issued by the Regional Administrator, under the regulation, appears at page 44 of the Record.

STATEMENT

The opinion of the court below contains a clear and concise statement of the relevant facts in this case. The following excerpts from that opinion set forth all the essential facts (R. 212-214):

Commercial apple drying services were first, on April 28, 1942, brought under price regulation by the General Maximum Price Regulation (7 F. R. 3153), which fixed the permissible prices for such services at their March, 1942, levels. On August 13, 1942, prior to the commencement of the 1942 apple drying season, such services were placed under § 103 (b) of Maximum Price Regulation 165, as amended (7 F. R. 6428). After the close of the 1942 apple drying season, on April 1, 1943, acting under the adjustment provision of Maximum Price Regulation 165, the Regional Administrator for Region VIII on his own initiative issued Order No. G-2 which retroactively adjusted upwards the maximum price set by Maximum Price Regulation 165 for all commercial drying services rendered upon apples sold to any agency of the United States government by persons located in California. Substantially all of the 1942 apple crop had been sold to the United States government. * * *

* * * Acting under § 114 (d) [pro-

viding for individual price adjustments under stated circumstances], the complainants, six commercial apple dryers from the Watsonville drying area in California, filed, on July 22, 1943, a joint application for adjustment. At the time of application the provisions of Order No. G-2 determined the charges which these complainants could lawfully receive for their drying services during the 1942 season. What complainants sought in this application was, in effect, a further retroactive increase in the maximum charges for apple drying in the 1942 season beyond what had already been given them under Order No. G-2.

The application for adjustment was denied by the Acting Regional Administrator on August 24, 1943. * * * Shortly thereafter, the complainants posted notices announcing that no apples would be accepted for commercial drying in the 1943 season.

On September 10, 1943, the complainants sought review of the Acting Regional Administrator's order denying their application for adjustment. On March 27, 1944, the Acting Price Administrator denied, on review, the application for adjustment.

The complainants filed, on May 25, 1944, a protest directed against Order No. G-2 and the Administrator's order of March 27, 1944. The protest was denied by the Administrator on June 29, 1944. On July 27, 1944, a complaint was filed with this court [Emergency Court of Appeals] and, pursuant to an order of the court, the protest proceedings were

reopened for the presentation of further evidence. Such additional evidence was filed in the reopened proceeding, and on February 20, 1945, the Administrator issued an order denying the protest upon reconsideration.

On September 26, 1945, the Emergency Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint on the ground that it had not been shown that the Price Administrator's action in denying petitioners' application for a retroactive adjustment of their maximum prices in excess of that theretofore granted was arbitrary or capricious or otherwise improper under section 114 (d) of Maximum Price Regulations No. 165—as amended, Services. (R. 212-216.)

On October 26, 1945, Mr. Chief Justice Stone issued an order "Upon consideration of the application of counsel for the petitioners," extending the time within which a petition for certiorari might be filed, "provided that power exists to extend such time under the applicable statutes." (R. 217.) The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on October 27, 1945.

ARGUMENT

In extending the time within which a petition for certiorari might be filed herein, this Court expressly left open the question of its power so to extend the time. The judgment of the court below was entered on September 26, 1945. The thirty-day period provided in Section 204 (d) of the Act for the filing of a petition for certiorari expired

on Friday, October 26. On the latter date the provisional order extending time was entered. Not until the following day, October 27, was the petition filed. It is our view that under the applicable statutes there is no authority to extend the time for filing a petition to review a judgment of the Emergency Court of Appeals, and that therefore the present petition was not timely filed.

Section 204 (d) of the Act, under which jurisdiction of this Court is invoked, provides, in part:

Within thirty days after entry of a judgment or order, interlocutory or final, by the Emergency Court of Appeals, a petition for a writ of certiorari may be filed in the Supreme Court of the United States, and thereupon the judgment or order shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court in the same manner as a judgment of a circuit court of appeals as provided in section 240 of the Judicial Code, as amended (U. S. C., 1934 edition, title 28, sec. 347) * * *

Except as provided in this section, no court, Federal, State, or Territorial, shall have jurisdiction or power to consider the validity of any such regulation, order, or price schedule, or to stay, restrain, enjoin, or set aside, in whole or in part, any provision of this Act authorizing the issuance of such regulations or orders, or making effective any such price schedule, or any provision of any such regulation, order, or price schedule, or to restrain or enjoin the enforcement of any such provision.

Authority to extend the thirty-day period provided in Section 204 (d) must, of course, be found in an applicable statute. Section 204 (d) makes reference to Section 240 of the Judicial Code, as amended, but does so only by way of providing that after a petition for certiorari is filed under the thirty-day time limit, "thereupon" the judgment is to be subject to review by this Court in the same manner as a judgment of a circuit court of appeals. Even if the reference to Section 240 of the Judicial Code were more inclusive, the petitioner would not be aided. Section 240 of the Judicial Code contains no provision concerning the time for filing petitions for certiorari. The matter of time is covered by Section 8 (a) of the Act of February 13, 1925, c. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 28 U. S. C. 350. That section provides:

SEC. 8. (a) That no writ of error, appeal, or writ of certiorari, intended to bring any judgment or decree before the Supreme Court for review shall be allowed or entertained unless application therefor be duly made within three months after the entry of such judgment or decree, excepting that writs of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the Phillippine Islands may be granted where application therefor is made within six months: *Provided*, That for good cause shown either of such periods for applying for a writ of certiorari may be extended not exceeding sixty days by a justice of the Supreme Court.

It is evident that the foregoing provision for extension of time is made applicable only to the cases governed by the limitations of three months and, with respect to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, six months. It follows, we believe, that the question as it relates to the Emergency Court of Appeals must be assimilated to the practice with respect to appeals (as distinguished from petitions for certiorari) from state courts, which are not embraced by the proviso to Section 8 (a) of the 1925 Act, and petitions for certiorari to review judgments in criminal cases, which are governed by the Criminal Appeals Rules pursuant to special act of Congress. In neither of these types of cases does authority exist for the extension of time within which to bring a case to this Court. Cf. *United States ex rel. Coy v. United States*, 316 U. S. 342; Robertson and Kirkham, *Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States*, pp. 718, 777.

The conclusion thus to be drawn from the text of the applicable statutes is supported also by the obvious purpose of the thirty-day period prescribed in Section 204 (d) of the Emergency Price Control Act. In addition to the shortened period for filing petitions, that section provides that "the Supreme Court shall advance on the docket and expedite the disposition of all causes filed therein pursuant to this subsection." More-

over, Section 204 (b) postpones the effectiveness of a judgment of the Emergency Court setting aside a price regulation, "until the expiration of thirty days from the entry thereof, except that if a petition for a writ of certiorari is filed with the Supreme Court under subsection (d) within such thirty days, the effectiveness of such judgment shall be postponed until an order of the Supreme Court denying such petition becomes final, or until other final disposition of the case by the Supreme Court." This appears to be a further recognition of the limitation of thirty days placed upon the time within which certiorari may be applied for.¹

It is therefore submitted that the present petition must be denied as not having been filed within the time provided by law.

(2) The only substantive question which can be presented in this proceeding is whether the Price Administrator acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying petitioners' application under section 114 (d) of Maximum Price Regulation No. 165, as amended, for a retroactive adjustment of their maximum prices for apple drying services performed in the 1942 season. This section pro-

¹ While the legislative history of the Act does not deal with the specific problem, it reflects the concern of Congress for expedition in the review of judgments of the Emergency Court of Appeals. Cf. Report of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency to accompany H. R. 5990, S. Rep. No. 931, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 24; Report of the House Committee on Banking and Currency to accompany H. R. 5990, H. Rep. No. 1409, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 12.

vided² for individual price adjustments to persons subject to the regulation who showed:

(1) That there exists or threatens to exist in a particular locality a shortage in the supply of a service which aids directly in the war program or is essential to a standard of living consistent with the prosecution of the war; and

(2) That such local shortage will be substantially reduced or eliminated by adjusting the maximum prices of such seller and of like sellers for such service; and

(3) That such adjustment will not create or tend to create a shortage or a need for increase in prices, in another locality, and will effectuate the purposes of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended.

Maximum prices for the services in question originally came under control with the issuance of the General Maximum Price Regulation. Prior to the commencement of the 1942 season this regulation, so far as the maximum prices of apple drying services are concerned, was superseded by Maximum Price Regulation No. 165, as amended—Services. Petitioners filed no application for adjustment, although the regulation made express provision therefor and set forth the method of filing such an application. Not until

² This regulation was revised and reissued as Revised Maximum Price Regulation No. 165 on July 1, 1944, effective August 1, 1944 (9 F. R. 7439).

after the Regional Administrator, who was authorized to take action under the regulation, had, on his own initiative, granted an adjustment of maximum prices for the 1942 season, after the close of that season, did petitioners seek any price relief.

Individual adjustments can be granted only within the terms of regulatory provisions of general applicability making provision therefor. (See Section 2 (c) of the Act.) Although this regulation, like most maximum price regulations providing for adjustment of maximum prices on the application of a person subject thereto, does not expressly provide for retroactive adjustments, the Administrator has consistently taken the position that such action can and will be taken when necessary to effectuate the purposes of the adjustment provision. Clearly, however, such instances will be very limited in number. Where, as in the present case, maximum prices in effect prospectively are adequate to assure continued supply, retroactive increases will be granted only when it appears that the applicant will be unable to remain in operation unless he is permitted at the present time to collect additional amounts of money in connection with past transactions. In short, unless the applicant's financial structure is so impaired as clearly to indicate that, for financial reasons, it cannot continue in business, retroactive individual adjustment of maximum

prices will be denied. It is submitted that the court below was manifestly correct in holding that this administrative standard is reasonable (R. 214-215).

The record in this case is entirely lacking in any evidence tending to show that a retroactive adjustment of petitioners' maximum prices was required to effectuate the purposes of the adjustment provision of the regulation. It is submitted that the opinion of the court below is clearly correct, and that no extended argument is required on our part.

(3) This case presents no question of general importance or applicability. Petitioners have listed thirteen separate "objections" to the Administrator's action. These objections are, in general, repetitions of those presented to the Administrator, concerning which the court below remarked:

The complainants in their protest set forth 26 objections. Upon analysis of the situation as presented to this court, however, the issue properly before us is found to be very narrow.

We have only to determine whether the complainants have shown, under the requirements of the adjustment provision (§ 114 (d) of MPR 165, as amended), that it was arbitrary or capricious for the Price Administrator to refuse to grant the application for a further retroactive increase in the permissible service charges for the 1942 apple drying season (R. 214).

It thus appears that the sole issue presented is a narrow factual one, with no substantial question of federal law involved.

To be sure, in their protest (R. 2-4), in their complaint (R. 179-180) in the court below and in their petition for a writ of certiorari, petitioners have sought to raise broad issues of constitutional and statutory validity of the Administrator's action in this case. As properly observed by the court below (R. 214), such objections would be available only by way of protest against Maximum Price Regulation No. 165, and no such protest was filed by petitioners. It may further be pointed out, however, that at no time have petitioners sought to make specific or to support by evidence any of their general objections to the Price Administrator's action. There is no slightest evidence that Maximum Price Regulation No. 165 is generally unfair and inequitable or otherwise invalid. It further clearly appears that the administrative procedure followed by the Office of Price Administration was entirely proper within the terms of the Act. The statutory procedure is fully in accord with constitutional requirements of procedural due process. *Yakus v. United States*, 321 U. S. 414

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied as not filed within the time prescribed by

law. In any event the decision below is correct and does not warrant further review.

Respectfully submitted.

J. HOWARD McGRATH,
Solicitor General.

RICHARD H. FIELD,
General Counsel,
Office of Price Administration.

DECEMBER 1945.



APPENDIX

The pertinent provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, c. 26, 56 Stat. 23, are as follows:

SECTION 204 (d). Within thirty days after entry of a judgment or order, interlocutory or final, by the Emergency Court of Appeals, a petition for a writ of certiorari may be filed in the Supreme Court of the United States, and thereupon the judgment or order shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court in the same manner as a judgment of a circuit court of appeals as provided in section 240 of the Judicial Code, as amended (U. S. C., 1934 edition, title 28, sec. 347). The Supreme Court shall advance on the docket and expedite the disposition of all causes filed therein pursuant to this subsection. The Emergency Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court upon review of judgments and orders of the Emergency Court of Appeals, shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any regulation or order issued under section 2, of any price schedule effective in accordance with the provisions of section 206, and of any provision of any such regulation, order, or price schedule. Except as provided in this section, no court, Federal, State, or Territorial, shall have jurisdiction or power to consider the validity of any such regulation, order, or price schedule, or to stay,

restrain, enjoin, or set aside, in whole or in part, any provision of this Act authorizing the issuance of such regulations or orders, or making effective any such price schedule, or any provision of any such regulation, order, or price schedule, or to restrain or enjoin the enforcement of any such provision.

Section 240 of the Judicial Code (28 U. S. C. 347) reads as follows:

(a) In any case, civil or criminal, in a circuit court of appeals, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, it shall be competent for the Supreme Court of the United States, upon the petition of any party thereto, whether Government or other litigant, to require by certiorari, either before or after a judgment or decree by such lower court, that the cause be certified to the Supreme Court for determination by it with the same power and authority, and with like effect, as if the cause had been brought there by unrestricted appeal.

(b) Any case in a circuit court of appeals where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any State, on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is against its validity, may, at the election of the party relying on such State statute, be taken to the Supreme Court for review on appeal; but in that event a review on certiorari shall not be allowed at the instance of such party, and the review on such appeal shall be restricted to an examination and decision

of the Federal questions presented in the case.

(c) No judgment or decree of a circuit court of appeals or of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court otherwise than as provided in this section.